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Revising the Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court: Mere Administrative Reform or
Substantive Policy Change?
S. Sidney Ulmer*
The United States Supreme Court, like Rhadamanthus, sits
in judgment on the dead in the lower world, but unlike that
just son of Zeus, the Court determines which dead cases should
be offered resurrection. This life-giving power fascinates stu-
dents of the processes by which the Court accepts and rejects
cases for review. However, every institutional exercise of power
involves an administrative dimension, i.e., the procedures by
which authority is utilized, as well as a substantive dimension.
According to their individual tastes, some scholars have con-
cerned themselves primarily with the Court's administrative
structure, while others have focused on the Court's policy mak-
ing process. In the former group are the members of the Study
Group on the Case Load of the Supreme Court.
A PROPOSAL TO REVISE THE JURISDICTION
OF THE SUPREME COURT
In recent years, a rise in the cost of legal services, the expan-
sion of the rights of criminal defendants, a general growth in
population and, therefore, litigation, and associated factors have
made lawyers, judges, scholars, and assorted court personnel
more cognizant of deficiencies in the operation of the federal
judicial system. In response, Congress in 1968 established the
Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C.,' to study the oper-
ation of the federal courts. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, Warren Burger, was designated Chairman of the Center.
Like other new appointees to the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Burger was impressed with the amount of work the
Court was required to perform during each term. Moreover,
when he projected current case load trends, he found the num-
bers discomforting. Official statistics showed that the num-
ber of Supreme Court cases docketed was 1,302 in 1941, 1,353
* Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
1. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 664.
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in 1951, 2,570 in 1961 and 4,515 in 1972.2 Although the number
of cases docketed increased at a decreasing rate, in absolute num-
bers the increase in cases between 1967 and 1971 was approx-
imately double that between 1942 and 1947. It was this absolute
measure that concerned the Chief Justice, since the number of
justices available to handle the case load remained constant at
nine3 and the jurisdiction of the Court had not been substan-
tially changed since 1925.4
In 1971, out of concern that the Court lacked sufficient time
to discharge its responsibilities adequately, the Chief Justice ap-
pointed a "Study Group on the Case Load of the Supreme
Court."5  After consulting with each of the current members
of the Supreme Court, one of the clerks serving the current
Chief Justice and two of the clerks who served Justices Black
and Harlan before their deaths, the Study Group concluded
that the Court was now overburdened with work and that the
pressures on each justice's time and intellect were excessive.
It found that the "conditions essential for the performance of
the Court's mission do not exist," that "the pressures of the
docket are incompatible with the appropriate fulfillment of
its historic and essential functions" and that, should present
trends continue, the Court or its function must necessarily
change.6 Believing that remedial measures were necessary, the
Study Group recommended the establishment of a National
2. Federal Judicial Center, REPORT OF THE STUDY GRouP ON TIlE
CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Report]. This report is also the source of the recommendation
for a National Court of Appeals.
3. The number of law clerks available to assist the justices has
increased from one before World War II to two in 1947 to three in 1969.
The Chief Justice has normally been assigned an additional clerk and
recently has been given additional administrative assistance. Law
clerks, however, do not decide cases. Final responsibility rests with
each justice and cannot be delegated.
4. The last change in the Court's jurisdiction was made in the
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
5. The Study Group was composed of Paul A. Freund, Carl M.
Loeb University Professor at the Harvard Law School, as Chairman,
Alexander M. Bickel, Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal His-
tory at Yale, Charles Alan Wright, McCormick Professor of Law at the
University of Texas Law School, Russell D. Niles, Director of the Insti-
tute of Judicial Administration and Charles Denison, Professor at the
New York University Law School, Robert L. Stern, a Chicago attorney
and former Acting Solicitor General of the United States, Bernard G.
Segal, a Philadelphia attorney and former president of The American
Bar Association, and Peter D. Ehrenhaft, a Washington, D.C., attorney
and former law clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren.
6. Report, supra note 2, at 581.
(Vol. 58:121
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
Court of Appeals to screen all petitions for review now filed in
the Supreme Court and to hear and decide many of the cases
presenting conflicting decisions from the Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals.
As proposed by the Study Group, the new court would con-
sist of seven active members of the United States Courts of
Appeals who would be assigned to the National Court for three
year terms on a staggered basis. Initially, a list of all Courts of
Appeals judges with five years service would be compiled. The
list would be ordered in terms of seniority. Judges would be
chosen alternately from each end of the list subject to the re-
strictions that (a) any judge could refuse service for cause, (b)
no two judges from the same court could serve simultaneously,
and (c) no judge could serve more than once until every judge
on the list had been offered an opportunity to serve. The Na-
tional Court of Appeals would be expected to submit about 400
cases a year to the Supreme Court. It would deny review with
finality or decide on the merits the other 3,500 to 4,000 cases
now being docketed annually for the Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court would make rules for the National Court and
would refain its power to certify any case for decision by itself,
including cases decided by the National Court of Appeals. How-
ever, for all practical purposes, a denial of review by the Na-
tional Court would be final. Thus, the solution offered by the
Study Group to the problem identified by Chief Justice Burger
is to reduce case load by blocking or reducing access to the Su-
preme Court's docket through modification of the Court's statu-
tory jurisdiction.
EARLIER MODIFICATIONS OF SUPREME COURT
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been modified
many times. The Judiciary Act of 17897 established a federal
district court for each of the states and three circuit courts, each
consisting of a district court judge and two justices of the Su-
preme Court. Since the Constitution granted the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction only, the power to review decisions of the
lower courts has -from the beginning depended on Congress.
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act specifically provided that any
state court decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional
or sustaining a state law against a constitutional challenge could
7. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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be appealed to the Supreme Court.8 The circuit courts were also
given some authority to review the decisions of district courts,
with the decisions of the circuit courts being subject to review
by the Supreme Court.
The right to appeal by Writ of Error may be referred to as
the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction. For the first hun-
dred years this was the primary avenue to review by the Su-
preme Court. In fact, until 1914, no case from a state court could
be reviewed except under the Supreme Court's obligatory juris-
diction. When the Circuit Courts of Appeals were created in
1891, the Supreme Court was given extensive discretionary juris-
diction for the first time." The 1891 Act established one Court
of Appeals in each of nine circuits. Although direct review by
the Supreme Court of some district court decisions would be
available, most appeals from the district courts were henceforth
to be brought in the new Courts of Appeals. After decision by
the latter court, further review by the Supreme Court was
available under both the Court's obligatory and discretionary
jurisdictions. The overall impact of the statute was to narrow
the Supreme Court's obligation to review federal court decisions
by enlarging the Court's discretionary jurisdiction in regard to
such cases. At the same time, the reform of jurisdiction was
limited and most cases continued to be subject to mandatory
review, if requested, at the highest level.
Until 1914 the power of the Supreme Court to review state
cases was obligatory in cases in which a federal right had been
claimed and denied in a state court. In that year, Congress
granted the right to have state decisions sustaining a federal
claim reviewed in the Supreme Court, but at the Court's dis-
cretion. 10 Two years later, however, Congress shifted certain
classes of state cases from the Court's obligatory to its discre-
tionary jurisdiction. Prior to 1916 a decision in a state court
denying a federal claim could be appealed to the Supreme Court
as a matter of right. Under the new statute, in cases involving
the validity of a federal statute, treaty or an authority exercised
under the power of the United States, if the lower court held
8. The power of the Supreme Court to review state court deci-
sions was sustained by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816); and Fairfax's Devisee v. Martin's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603
(1813).
9. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
10. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
11. Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726.
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against validity, the right to review was retained, but if the
lower court upheld validity, review was discretionary. In cases
involving the constitutionality of a state statute or authority ex-
ercised under state power, a decision below in favor of validity
continued to be reviewable as a matter of right but decisions
against validity were shifted to discretionary review. The con-
sequence of this congressional action was to shift about one
half of the state cases that formerly would have required review
by the Supreme Court to the Court's discretionary jurisdiction.
Under legislation enacted by Congress in 1915 and 1916,12
the decisions of the Courts of Appeals in cases pertaining to
revenue, patents, copyright, employer liability, safety appliance,
admirality, bankruptcy, trade mark and criminal laws, and cases
in which the jurisdiction of the district court depended on di-
versity of citizenship, were shifted to the Supreme Court's dis-
cretionary jurisdiction. These cases had previously been review-
able as a matter of right and constituted a sizable portion of
cases coming from the lower federal courts. The shift was not
dependent on the presence or absence of constitutional ques-
tions. Nevertheless, the Court's obligatory jurisdiction remained
large since, under the 1891 Act of Congress, 13 cases outside the
categories named above were reviewable by Writ of Error if the
amount in controversy exceeded $1,000.
The so-called "Judges Bill" of 192514 accomplished the last
major revision of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Review of
cases in the Supreme Court continues to be governed primarily
by the amendments to the judicial code which that statute in-
corporated. The act shifted from obligatory to discretionary
jurisdiction cases involving the exercise of federal and state au-
thority. Regarding appeals from state court decisions, Section
237(b) provided that:
It shall be competent for the Supreme Court, by certiorari, to
require that there be certified to it for review and determina-
tion, with the same power and authority and with like effect as
if brought up by Writ of Error ... [cases in which] any title,
right, privilege, or immunity, is specially set up or claimed by
either party under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of,
or commission held, or authority exercised under the United
States.
The power to review in such cases is discretionary and exists
whether or not the right claimed has been sustained or denied
12. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, 38 Stat. 803 and Act of Sept. 6,
1916, supra note 11.
13. Act of March 3, supra note 9.
14. Act of Feb. 13, supra note 4.
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below. The 1925 statute further limited the obligation of the
Supreme Court to review decisions of the Courts of Appeals.
The circuit courts were given the right to certify questions of
law to the Supreme Court for determination. Additionally, Sec-
tion 239 of the 1925 Act provided for the appeal of circuit court
decisions invalidating state laws, with review restricted to the
federal questions presented in the case.
The major impact of the 1925 revisions, however, was on the
right of litigants to have Court of Appeals decisions upholding
state laws and decisions either sustaining or invalidating federal
statutes reviewed in the Supreme Court. Prior to 1925 there
was an absolute right to appeal the decisions of the Courts of
Appeals with the exceptions noted earlier with regard to copy-
rights, bankruptcies and the other listed categories. Under the
"Judges Bill," however, the extent to which the Courts of Ap-
peals were to function henceforth as courts of last resort was
made subject to Supreme Court control. For all practical pur-
poses, review of their decisions was shifted from the obligatory
to the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. At the
present time, about 90 percent of the Court's business comes
by means of its discretionary jurisdiction and only 10 percent
by appeal or other route.
CURRENT AND TRADITIONAL REASONS
FOR JURISDICTIONAL REFORM
If we look not just at the proposals of the Study Group but
also at the history of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, the Study
Group's recommendations can be placed in proper perspective.
Historically, increases in the Supreme Court's workload have led
to modification of the Court's jurisdiction. The need for ade-
quate time has been perceived, to some extent, as an adminis-
trative problem and has periodically occasioned a congressional
response featuring some revision of administrative structures.
For example, the 1891 statute establishing the intermediate cir-
cuit courts was designed to reduce the pressure on the Supreme
Court by providing for final settlement of many cases in the
Courts of Appeals. The changes made in 1925 and those recom-
mended by the Study Group reflect the same type of concern.
According to Peter Ehrenhaft, one of the members of the
Study Group, the screening of cases by the National Court of
Appeals would give the Supreme Court time to adequately con-
sider such difficult problems as abortion and desegregation.'
15. The Advocates, Televised discussion of the topic: "Should
[Vol. 58:121
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The time required in such cases is not available, Ehrenhaft ar-
gues, when the Court must annually handle 4,000 petitions for
certiorari, each of which runs to 40 pages or more in length.16
Such a workload, in Ehrenhaft's view, inhibits creative reflec-
tion and the collegial discussion necessary to rational decision
making; a view shared, he says, by eight of the justices now sit-
ting on the Court.1 7  Implicitly or explicitly, comments of this
sort convey the proposition that more time is needed for reflec-
tion and interaction among the justices in order to achieve an im-
provement in the quality of the decisions made and the opinions
written. In short, an administrative problem is identified and an
administrative solution is suggested.
Chief Justice Taft testified before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in 1925 that although the legislation enacted in 1915 and
1916 was designed to reduce the Court's docket, the reduction
had been insufficient. The "Judges Bill" was needed, he as-
serted, because "there is no other way by which the docket in
our court can be reduced so that we can manage it."1 Reduc-
tion in the docket was necessary, in other words, in order to
catch up. At the time, Taft described the Court as 15 months
behind in its work. According to Justice McReynolds, it was a
question of "whether the court will slip behind and delays will
increase or whether the number of cases presented to the court
shall be restricted."' 9
Although reduction in the docket was seen as a way of per-
mitting more attention to important cases and less to trivial ones,
the primary reason advanced to justify the requested changes
was the delay inherent in the backlog and the resulting injustice
to litigants. As Chief Justice Taft expressed it:
Often in the legislature there is a resounding eloquence on the
subject that every poor man should have the opportunity to
carry his case to the last court. There is no statement that is
so unfounded as that. The truth is that it is in the interest
of the poor litigant that litigation should be ended, and, my
dear friends, there is nothing that offers such an opportunity for
delay as a suggestion that a profound constitutional question is
involved in sustaining a verdict in favor of the poor litigant
We Create a National Court of Appeals to Ease the Burden on the Su-
preme Court," WNETIN.Y. Feb. 9, 1973, [hereinafter cited as Advo-
cates].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 66 CONG. REc. 2920 (1925).
19. Hearing on H.R. 8206 Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
68th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
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when the rich litigant has a long purse with which to continue
the litigation. 20
In contrast, the Study Group was compelled to develop a
different justification for changes in the Supreme Court's juris-
diction since the Court is not currently behind in its work.
Alan Dershowitz, Professor of Law at Harvard and former law
clerk in both the Supreme Court and a Court of Appeals, has de-
scribed the Court as virtually the only one in the country with
no significant backlog "despite the fact that it no longer meets
on Saturday, as it used to, and now takes four month vacations
each year."'21 Eugene Gressman, a Washington, D.C., attorney
and expert on Supreme Court practice, has urged a distinction
between hard work and overwork and suggested that the Court
is "the most current of any judicial body in the country today."
According to him, if you have a case "that is ready for disposi-
tion today (Wednesday), . . . it will literally be distributed and
considered by the Court on Friday of this week, and it will be
determined thereafter within a matter of a week or 10 days.
That is on petitions for review. '22 In addition, Gressman says:
[E]very case that is heard and granted review and orally argued
is decided the very same term in which it is argued. Indeed,
there are not enough cases on the docket today for argument
to fill up the Supreme Court's argument schedule for the entire
term. They are cutting back the days of argument from four
days a week to three days a week because of a lack of cases for
oral argument and consideration on the merits. 2-
These assertions have not been challenged as to factual accuracy
by the members of the Study Group.
In short, the factual situation supporting the new proposal
to modify the Supreme Court's jurisdiction lacks a basic ingre-
dient which was present in the 1925 and earlier situations-the
fact of backlog and delay in deciding cases and the resulting in-
justice to litigants. As a consequence, proponents of the Study
Group's proposal have been forced to devote more time to argu-
ments bearing on the qualitative improvements to be accom-
plished by further limiting the time spent reviewing petitions
for certiorari.
THE NEED FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATIVE
STRUCTURE TO DEAL WITH AN OLD
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM
The methods historically suggested to reduce the Court's
20. Id. at 28-29.
21. Advocates, supra note 15.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
workload and those recommended by the Study Group differ
dramatically. The traditional response to the administrative
problem has been to shift cases from the Court's obligatory juris-
diction to its discretionary jurisdiction. The assumption under-
lying this procedure is that the more the Court controls its own
docket, the greater its ability to limit full review to important
cases. The proposal of the Study Group suggests, in effect, that
while the assumption may be valid, the traditional solution is
no longer adequate as a time saving device since the exercise of
discretion itself is consuming too much valuable time.
The assumption that the Court's exercise of its discretionary
jurisdiction is excessively time consuming is a proposition that
has, in fact, been debated. Such an assumption can be assessed
only if we have adequate information about the Court's proce-
dures in handling certiorari applications. In testifying before the
House Judiciary Committee in 1925, Chief Justice Taft com-
mented on the misunderstanding some persons had about the
disposition of certiorari applications:
I heard the late Philander Knox . . . say ... a word or two
indicating that he thought the question of whether a case got
in by certiorari or not was governed by the temperament, the
digestion and the good nature of the particular person in the
Court to whom the question was referred, that it was distributed
in some way so that each member of the Court had two or
three certioraris that it could let in. * * * *
And so I told Mr. Knox that we didn't distribute certioraris
and their allowance on any such basis. * * * *
Now, the truth is, and I want to emphasize that because I
think perhaps I have more to do with certioraris in one way
than any other member of the court. because I have to make the
first statement of the case when a certiorari comes up for dis-
position; I write out every case that comes up for certiorari
and I read it to the court. I think the members of the court are
a little impatient sometimes because I give too much detail.
Perhaps that is because I am a new member, or was a new mem-
ber. And then having stated the case I go around and ask each
member of the court, who has his memorandum, as to what
view he takes. Then having discussed the case we vote on it.
And being a new member of the court and having a kind
heart, I am inclined to grant probably more than is wise, and
I am too often voted down on that subject to make me entirely
confident that I am right.2 4
The procedure described by Chief Justice Taft, if actually
used, would clearly consume prodigious amounts of time if cer-
tiorari applications were presented in sizable numbers. While
it appears that the Court could afford such a "luxury" prior to
24. Hearing, supra note 19, at 26-27.
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the enactment of the "Judges Bill," extensive consideration of
certiorari applications is no longer practical, considering the en-
largement of the discretionary jurisdiction and the increases in
total cases docketed in later years. In the debate over President
Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to "pack the Court" in 1937, Hugo
Black, then a Senator from Alabama, remarked in the Senate:
The idea I have, and have had since long before the Presi-
dent's message came to this body, is that it is wholly and com-
pletely impossible for the judges, with the amount of work they
have to do, to give to the individual applications for certiorari
the close personal attention which is absolutely essential. 26
In the same period, Justice Stone argued that the rejection of
applications for certiorari was not a consequence of a lack of
time to deal with them.2 6 Justice Harlan stated in 1963 that the
Court could manage its docket. 27 Justice Douglas has often as-
serted that the Court is not overworked,28 and four retired jus-
tices are said to be of this view. 29 However, eight of the present
justices apparently think otherwise.8 0 While some exchanges on
this topic may lend themselves to political interpretation, the
obvious relationship between increasing numbers of certiorari
applications and the time needed to dispose of them has been of
continuing interest.
As the certiorari cases disposed of annually have increased
from about 450 in 1923 to about 4,000 in 1971, the Taft proce-
dure, of necessity, has undergone modifications. The detail of
each change in procedure or its timing is not known, but in 1970
a Special Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, ap-
pointed to investigate charges against Justice Douglas, obtained
information concerning procedures that prevailed in the Warren
Court. According to the report of the committee:
When a petition for an extraordinary writ is received, it is
placed on the Miscellaneous Docket and initially screened by
the Clerk. If the matter appears to be frivolous, it is sent to the
office of the Chief Justice for review. The petition is pro-
cessed by the staff of the Chief Justice and a digest is distrib-
25. 81 CONG. REc. 2828-29 (1937).
26. Reported in A.T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, PILLAR OF TME
LAW 448 (1956).
27. Quoted to that effect by Alan Dershowitz, Advocates, supra
note 15.
28. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas, The Supreme Court and its Case
Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1960).
29. According to Eugene Gressman based on conversations with
retired Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark, Goldberg, and Reed.
Advocates, supra note 15.
30. See Peter Ehrenhaft, Advocates, supra note 15. To some extent,
this is a controversial question.
[Voi. 58:121
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uted to the other Justices. If the staff's examination shows that
the matter is frivolous, the Chief Justice "special lists" it. A
"special listed" case is withdrawn from the regular order of cases
filed in the Court and placed with similar cases in a separate
category. When a case is "special listed," unless at least one of
the Justices affirmatively requests that the matter be discussed,
it is never discussed by the judges at the weekly Friday con-
ference. Denial by the Supreme Court is automatic.3 '
This arrangement indicates that over the years, as the Taft pro-
cedure became too prohibitively time consuming, the Court eased
the situation by shifting a greater responsibility for certiorari
applications to the Clerk of the Supreme Court and to the law
clerks. This method is not only administratively feasible, but
also has undoubtedly accounted for the ability of the Court to
stay abreast of its docket in recent years. The Court has found
that by "special listing" from 50 to 60 percent of the certiorari
applications, it can devote some modicum of time to considera-
tion of the remainder.
More recent news sources indicate that further modification
of the procedure for handling certiorari applications has oc-
curred in the Burger Court. It is reported -3 2 that at the sugges-
tion of Justice Powell, the petitions are now assigned to one of
the law clerks who prepares a single memo of one to fifteen
pages for consideration by Justices Burger, Powell, Blackmun,
Rehnquist and White. The same source reports that this proce-
dure has not been used by Justices Douglas, Marshall and Bren-
nan, who continue to read every petition.
In light of these revelations, there seems little doubt that
the mere exercise of discretion can itself be as time consuming
as the Study Group has suggested, and that, in recognition of
this fact, certain short cuts to decision on certiorari applications
have been adopted. These procedures are clearly satisfactory
solutions to the problem from the standpoint of maintaining a
current docket. However, one may question whether Congress
intended such procedures when it passed the 1925 amendments
to the Judicial Code and whether the practice is constitutional.
LINKAGES BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES
AND SUBSTANTIVE POLICY MAKING
An additional contrast between the historical treatment of
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and the posture of the Study
31. Final Report by the Special Subcommittee on H. Res. 920 of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1970).
32. T=ME, Dec. 11, 1972, at 72.
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Group may be seen in the extent to which these two sources
differ in their appreciation of the nexus between administrative
reform and substantive change. In the case of the Supreme
Court, the processes of judicial decision and judicial adminis-
tration are not necessarily on the opposite ends of a continuum.
This point is well illustrated in the process by which the Su-
preme Court develops rules of procedure for the lower federal
courts. Under 28 U.S.C., Section 2072, the Supreme Court pre-
pares rules of procedures and submits them to Congress for con-
sideration. Unless Congress acts to affirmatively veto such rules
within 90 days of receipt, they become law. The Chief Justice
has the power to assign the initial development of rules to the
Judicial Conference of the United States. The current practice
is for the Conference to prepare an initial draft of rules for ap-
proval by the Supreme Court and submission to Congress.
Theoretically, procedural rules are matters of efficient ad-
ministration, and the Supreme Court in this area is merely ex-
ercising its responsibility for the administration of the federal
court system. However, Justices Douglas and Black spent years
pointing to the changes in substantive rights being effected by
the promulgation of rules of procedure.
In January 1971, new Rules of Procedure for the Trial of
Minor Offenses Before U.S. Magistrates took effect.88 These
rules had been approved by the Supreme Court. Consistent with
usual practice, no action to the contrary was taken by the Con-
gress. One of the rules adopted requires magistrates to inform
a defendant charged with a minor offense other than a petty
offense of his rights to retain counsel, to have counsel appointed,
to be tried by a jury and to be tried before a federal district
judge.8 4 A second rule, however, required that a defendant
charged with a petty offense be told only of his right to counsel
and his right to trial before a district court judge.85 In dissent-
ing from the rules, Justices Black and Douglas pointed out that,
by strong negative pregnant, a defendant charged with a petty
offense does not have the right to appointed counsel or the
right to trial by jury.3 6
From the Black-Douglas perspective, this rule was a dilution
of the rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment. In their
opinion:
33. Reprinted at 91 S. Ct. 2297.
34. Rule 2, reprinted id. at 2302-03.
35. Rule 3, reprinted id. at 2303-04.
36. Id. at 2306-10.
[Vol. 58:121
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Assuming that the judiciary will continue to enact "procedural"
rules under congressional delegations of power, it is essential
that these rules be truly procedural and not affect the substan-
tial rights of defendants.... A very plausible reading of to-
day's action is that we have prescribed that defendants in the
federal system have no right to jury trial or assigned counsel
where the maximum possible penalty does not exceed six
months. But both of these issues have occasioned lively con-
troversy in previous cases.... [W]e consider it entirely inap-
propriate for the Court to indirectly suggest answers to these
serious constitutional issues when it is acting in a "rule making"
capacity and has no case or controversy before it.
3
7
The point of this discussion for purposes of this Article is simply
to demonstrate that substantive change affecting fundamental
values and power relationships can result from what are os-
tensibly changes in administrative structure and processes. 8
THE POLICY BIAS OF JUDICIAL STRUCTURES
The inherent policy bias of administrative structures, in-
cluding judicial structures, has always been understood by cer-
37. Id. at 2309-10.
38. Recently, the Supreme Court issued Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence for U.S. Courts and Magistrates to take effect on July 1, 1973,
absent congressional intervention. See 93 S. Ct. 1-168 (Jan. 1, 1973,
yellow pages). Some of these proposed rules involve significant de-
partures from pre-existing law. For example, Rule 509 grants the fed-
eral government the right to withhold "state secrets" and other official
information at trial if in the public interest; Rules 803 and 804 permit
hearsay evidence if the trial judge considers it trustworthy; and Rule
505 permits one spouse to testify against another as to matters occur-
ring prior to marriage regardless of the potential for marital discord.
In addition, the traditional doctor-patient privilege is omitted, although
Rule 504 protects the confidences between a patient and his psycho-
therapist. In this case, only Justice Douglas dissented, and his dissent
was limited to the legal authority of the Court to promulgate Rules of
Evidence and to the perfunctory role that the Court plays in approv-
ing the recommendations of the Judicial Conference.
Although Justice Douglas did not object to the substantive content
of the proposed rules, others have. For example, former Justice Gold-
berg reacted to the proposals by urging Congress to rewrite the Rules
of Evidence and to deprive the Supreme Court of the power to issue
such rules in the first place. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1973, at 16, col. 1.
According to him, the Proposed Rules of Evidence not only represent
the first time uniform rules of evidence for the entire federal system
have been attempted, but also represent legislating by the judicial
branch. They threaten, unconstitutionally in Goldberg's mind, to wipe
out state laws of evidence. The proposed rules have also been attacked
by the New York City Bar Association, the Washington Council of Law-
yers, and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., among others. Indeed, under Sen-
ator Ervin's leadership, the Senate on February 7, 1973, approved a bill
that will delay action on the new rules until the end of the 1973 leg-
islative session. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1973, at 13, col 1. A month
later, the House voted 399 to 1 to postpone the imposition of the new
rules indefinitely. See N.Y. Times, March 15, 1973, at 19, col 1.
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tain limited elites. The hearings and debates on the 1925 "Judges
Bill," a bill intended to solve an administrative problem, indi-
cate that a number of Congressmen appreciated the impact of
the proposed changes on the status and power of government
units and the choices which the bill represented among com-
peting political theories.
The principle that federal and state courts stand on a dif-
ferent footing vis-A-vis the federal political system has been
basic to the jurisdiction of the federal courts from the begin-
ning. The Judiciary Act of 1789 was drawn in such a way that
the decisions of state courts upholding the constitutionality of
state statutes were appealable as a matter of right to the Su-
preme Court. Decisions upholding the Constitution were not so
reviewable. This was an obvious "stacking of the deck" in fa-
vor of parties claiming constitutional protection, since "[i] t was
feared when the statute was drawn . . .that the judges of the
State courts might not pay sufficient attention to the Federal
Constitution, to Federal statutes, and Federal treaties. '3  The
principle was diluted slightly in 1914 when parties on the other
side of the issues were permitted to seek review in the Court,
but review in those cases was subject to the Supreme Court's
discretionary jurisdiction. Thus, the federal bias was continued.
The provision in the 1925 bill terminating the right to have
Courts of Appeals' decisions reviewed in the Supreme Court (in-
cluding cases in which the constitutionality of state statutes
was challenged) did not arouse the kind of fear which had
been expressed about state courts. According to Chief Justice
Taft, it was believed that the federal court "would be more likely
to preserve the Federal view of the issue than the State court,
at least to an extent to justify making a review of its decision
in our court conditional upon our approval."' 0 If a Court of
Appeals did not give proper respect to the federal view, the
Supreme Court could still review the case by granting certiorari.
As it turned out, the 1925 bill was amended before passage to
require review, if requested, of a decision by a Court of Appeals
which invalidated a state law, but review of decisions uphold-
ing state statutes against a constitutional challenge was made
subject to the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction. Chief
Justice Taft's faith in the ability of the federal courts to inter-
39. 66 CONG. REC. 2923 (1925) (Remarks of Senator Walsh of
Montana).
40. Id. at 2922.
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pret the Constitution and their tendency to favor the federal
view was, therefore, reflected in the bill that became law.
Subjective value choices in the guise of objective adminis-
trative reform are also involved in the selection of political the-
ories which serve as a framework for reform and in the factors
which the judges consider relevant in the exercise of their dis-
cretion. The first phenomenon is best illustrated by the argu-
ments over. a multilevel court system. To some extent, the multi-
level federal court system was a response to increasing case
loads rather than a product of conscious political theory. How-
ever, once a system affording trial and two levels of review is
established, theoretical justifications may be adduced. The ar-
gument in support of two levels of review emphasizes the need
to assure both that litigants receive correct and "just" decisions
and that decisions having serious ramifications for the entire
political system are made consistent with the needs of the sys-
tem. This latter aim is thought more likely to be accomplished
by assuring review in a court in which system needs are ade-
quately comprehended. The obvious candidate for this role is
the Supreme Court.
The competing view is that once a person has his case heard
in two courts, that is enough. Further review invites delay which
in itself is unfair to litigants. Justice McReynolds asserted in
1924 that "after a man has had two trials in Federal courts, un-
less his case involves something more than his private interests
and is of public importance, it ought to stop."41 He also stated
that "after a man has tried his case through all the State courts
and has had a judgment finally, it ought to stop, unless it in-
volves something more than his individual rights."4 2 The Study
Group appears to subscribe to the McReynolds position. Alex-
ander Bickel, a member of the Study Group, has argued that
it is inconceivable that every aggrieved citizen should have the
right to bring a federal claim to the Supreme Court.4 3 However,
it was quite conceivable in 1925 during the debate on the last
major legislation to make significant change in the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction. With regard to provisions of that bill shift-
ing certain cases from obligatory to discretionary jurisdiction,
one Senator objected that:
I do not thin it is right to withdraw from the citizen the
right to appeal to the highest courts in the land if he wants to
appeal. For a Supreme Court judge to say to any citizen, I care
41. Hearing, supra note 19, at 21.
42. Id.
43. Advocates, supra note 15.
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not how humble he may be, simply that he cannot appeal a case
involving his rights, that he cannot and will not be heard, it
seems to me is wrong. * * * * I do not want our Supreme
Court judges to be overworked, but I, for one, think more of
the rights of the citizen under the organic law of the land than
I do of any effort to lessen their work .... * * * If we are not
careful and watchful the day will come when the highest
court in this land will be open to nobody but the immensely
rich and the great corporate concerns of the country. The hum-
ble citizen in the common walks of life will not be able to
reach the high court if we are going to permit judges . . . to
lay down rules and regulations by which a citizen is to lose his
right to carry certain cases from the lower courts to the highest
court.
44
Whatever the merit of this sentiment, it reflects a viewpoint
that many laymen would undoubtedly credit. Indeed, even Jus-
tice Goldberg has described the fact that the Supreme Court has
been open to the claim of any citizen as the Court's greatest vir-
tue.45 This is not to say that Professor Bickel is incorrect in his
view that there is not and never has been any absolute right to
Supreme Court review, but the views expressed in Congress and
by Justice Goldberg probably represent political theory that has
considerable support in the country at large. Moreover, the
correctness of Bickel's position does not diminish the fact that
the ability of a litigant to get review in the Supreme Court as
a matter of right has steadily declined and that under the pro-
posal of the Study Group, the opportunity for discretionary re-
view would be diluted.
REVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISDICTION AS
A THREAT TO SUBJECTIVE VALUE STRUCTURE
A related opportunity for subjective values to affect the ob-
jectivity of the judicial process inheres in the Supreme Court's
determination of who gets access to its processes. It would
probably require access to the Court's conference room to de-
termine what values are being served by the Court's exercise
of its discretionary jurisdiction, whether these values are le-
gally relevant and whether decisions on certiorari applications
are collective judgments or merely express the more or less
fortuitous coalescence of the idiosyncratic preferences of indi-
vidual justices. Lacking that access, we have had to rely on in-
direct information and second hand sources. Nevertheless, we
are not totally without information in this area, and what is
44. 66 CONG. REC. 2928 (1925).
45. Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE Nsw REPuBLIc, Feb. 10,
1973, at 16.
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known has significant implications for any suggested change.
When an administrative reform which would deprive the Su-
preme Court of the discretionary jurisdiction it has exercised for
over 45 years is proposed, it is reasonable to inquire whether
such a reform might be accompanied by substantive changes in
current policies and in the interests now being served by the
exercise of discretionary authority. Adequate analysis of a pro-
posal such as that of the Study Group would require that these
substantive changes be brought out in the open and fully dis-
cussed so that a rational decision can be made regarding both
administrative and substantive reform. Given our past experi-
ences and the widening recognition of the relationship of ad-
ministrative change to policy change, the posture taken by the
Study Group is at least unrealistic and probably poses a se-
rious impediment to a reasoned consideration of the real prob-
lem it has identified.
The Report of the Study Group concedes that in recom-
mending a shift of discretionary power from the Supreme Court
to the newly proposed Court, "some room is opened up for the
play of the subjectivity of the judges of the National Court of
Appeals," but takes the position that "someone's subjectivity is
unavoidable." 46  The question, however, is not whether some-
one's subjectivity must, of necessity, be exercised in granting
and denying review by the Supreme Court, but whose subjec-
tivity should be built into the administrative structure which
selects cases for review. The Study Group's suggestion that
Supreme Court preferences will become known to the National
Court and that these subjective preferences will be the basis
of action by the National Court is ephemeral. Equally ephem-
eral is the argument that since the Supreme Court will retain
the right to certify for its own decision cases pending before the
National Court and to make rules for that Court, adequate sanc-
tions for ensuring a role for Supreme Court preferences will
exist. The Study Group's contention that its recommendation
"ninimizes the chances of an erratic subjectivity" 47 seems
purely speculative.
The decision to exercise the Supreme Court's discretionary
jurisdiction in a particular case is not determined by a single
vote. Instead, the Court grants applications for certiorari if as
many as four justices so desire.48 How the necessary four votes
46. Report, supra note 2, at 594.
47. Id.
48. In testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in 1924,
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come together at a particular time can be a highly erratic or ac-
cidental coalescence of four justices each voting his idiosyn-
cratic preferences. Of course, there may be cases in which all
the justices read the same facts and the same law and come
to the same "required" decision. However, it is likely that there
are enough of the other type of cases to make the matter of
trenchant import for the Study Group's proposal. If the use of
discretion by Supreme Court justices to grant or deny review
is a function of the subjective preferences of the individual jus-
tice, then a shift of this power to a different group of judges,
no matter how selected or rotated, raises the question of whether
and to what extent the subjective preferences of the second
group will match those of the Supreme Court. On the other
hand, if it could be shown that the decisions to grant or deny
access to the Supreme Court do not vary among the justices,
then the shift of jurisdiction is less threatening.
A number of commentators have argued that the identity
of the particular individual sitting as judge affects the exercise
of the Supreme Court's discretionary power,49 and several have
Justice Van Devanter remarked:
We do not grant or deny these [certiorari] petitions merely
according to a majority vote. We always grant the petition
when as many as four think that it should be granted, and
sometimes when as many as three think that way. We proceed
upon the theory that, if that number out the of nine [sic] are im-
pressed with the thought that the case is one that ought to be
heard and decided by us, the petition should be granted.
Hearing, supra note 19, at 8. Cf. Justice Brennan's remarks in Ohio v.
Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959).
49. Justice Black was of the view that the "socialization" of a man
helped to explain his behavior in certain situations. While in the Sen-
ate, he remarked:
[I]t is no charge against the integrity of an individual, as a
Senator or as a Congressman or as a judge, to say that we believe
that in the performance of his official function he will continue
to follow the natural bent of his mind. He is still a man.
He was a baby once, just as everybody else was a baby. He had
to be waited on as a baby just as every other baby in the country
was waited on by its mother. Later he probably went to the
same kind of school as other boys and studied the same kind of
books .... That very man, who was once a baby like other
babies, perhaps became a member of the judiciary. He had the
same mind that he had before he went on the bench, with the
same human tendencies and the same human inclinations.
Most men would be unable to change their natural bent of
mind in connection with an economic question because, as Chief
Justice Hughes said in his book on the Supreme Court, those men
are already of mature mind and mature convictions, He said
further that they are likely to continue to have those convictions
after they go on the bench, and we know that they do. We know
that they have in the past, that they do now, and that they
undoubtedly will in the future. So there is no charge against
the integrity of any prospective judge on the ground that it is
anticipated that with reference to economic predilections after
[Vol. 58:121
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suggested the problems this creates for the Study Group's pro-
posals. Although Professor Paul Carrington of the University
of Michigan Law School has stated that there is no reason why
proponents and opponents of the Study Group proposals should
divide along partisan political or ideological lines,50 Professor
Paul Bator of the Harvard Law School has observed that the
Study Group proposal is not simply a technical reform. It has,
Bator has said, "a serious effect on the policy making and law
making function of the Court."51 Chief Judge Friendly of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has pre-
dicted that the effect would be "not necessarily in tune with
the [Supreme] Court's views" and has wondered whether the
country could accept such a result.5 2 Former Justice Goldberg
has gone further and stated that the proposal, if adopted, would
deny Americans their historic right to take every case involving
substantial constitutional questions to the Supreme Court.5 3 Pe-
ter Ehrenhaft has answered that the Study Group had no such
intention and that the Group hoped there would be no "im-
pingement on the right of anyone, poor, criminal defendant, or
any other kind of litigant to reach the Supreme Court."5 4 These
exchanges are important since they force the Study Group and
others to recognize the policy implications inherent in the Study
Group proposal. Assuming that the identity of the individual
judge does make a difference in determining who gets heard in
the Supreme Court, changing the decision-makers will possibly,
if not likely, change the nature of the questions chosen for re-
view as well as the interests whose claims are to be heard. This
is all speculation, however, and we cannot predict with certainty
what the future holds if the reforms recommended are adopted.
At the same time, it is possible to assess empirically, to some
extent, the possibility or probability of idiosyncratic variation
among justices in handling certiorari applications. It is to that
question that we now turn.
AN ASSESSMENT OF VALUE-PREFERENCE
VARIATION AMONG JUDGES
This analysis begins with the proposition that if Supreme
he goes on the bench, he will still be the same man that he was
before he went there.
81 CoNG. REc. 2827-2828 (1937).
50. Advocates, supra note 15.
51. Id.
52. N.Y. Times, November 14, 1972, at 6, col 1.
53. See note 45 supra.
54. Advocates, supra note 15.
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Court justices differ among themselves in responding to cer-
tiorari applications, then differences between their response and
that of any other set of judges are likely to occur. It is further
assumed that once the values which influence the decision to
grant or deny certiorari are identified, one has also identified the
policy areas in which the proposed new screening court poses the
threat that it may not exhibit similar preferences.
Ordinarily, the information needed to assess the response of
individual justices is not available since the votes of the justices
on certiorari applications are cast in secret and no public ac-
counting or publication of voting splits or patterns is made.
However, upon his death in 1964, Justice Burton's papers were
deposited in the Library of Congress and opened to students of
the Supreme Court. Included in the papers was a record of the
votes cast by individual justices on certiorari applications dur-
ing his tenure on the Court, 1945-1958. These records omit the
"special listed" applications which are not brought to conference
for discussion and decision. A one third sample of this data for
the 1947-1956 terms has been drawn and will be used to evaluate
the extent to which Supreme Court justices differ in their re-
sponse to requests for review. While the data deal with a par-
ticular decade and a particular set of 15 justices, it might be ex-
pected that these justices were fairly typical of those sitting on
more recent courts, especially since a number of the justices in
this period carried over to later courts. In any case, the presence
of individualistic voting patterns on certiorari applications by
one Court suggests the same characteristic in any other Court.
In an earlier study of 2,361 applications for certiorari, Joseph
Tanenhaus and his associates suggested four values that heavily
influenced or determined the Supreme Court's decision to grant
or deny certiorari in the period 1947-1958. 55 These values were
(a) superior right of the federal government to review as meas-
ured by voting response when the federal government was the
petitioning party, (b) consistency in federal court decisions as
measured by voting response when the case involved dissension
among judges or courts below, (c) superior right of a civil lib-
erty claim to review when measured by voting response in cases
involving such a claim, and (d) superior right of an economic
55. J. Tanenhaus, M. Schick, M. Muraskin, D. Rosen, The Supreme
Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAK-
ING 111 (G. Schubert ed. 1963).
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claim to review when measured by voting response to cases in-
volving such a claim. These investigators found that the first
three values were in fact significantly associated with the deci-
sions of the Court to grant or deny certiorari. In statistical terms,
the federal government as petitioning party was found to ex-
plain 7.4 percent of the variance" in the decisions, civil liberty
questions 3.9 percent and dissension 2.4 percent. Taken collec-
tively, these three values accounted for 13.7 percent of the total
variance.
The Tanenhaus findings, however, are for the decisions of
the Court as a whole and provide no information on decision
at the level of the individual justices. Consequently, that study
cannot answer an inquiry regarding the extent, if any, to which
the justices differ among themselves. These findings are re-
sponsive, however, to the assumption that the Court as a whole
will exhibit certain value preferences which may be altered if
the proposed National Court is established. Eighty percent of
the petitions involving all three values will be granted. When
the federal government is the petitioning party and a civil lib-
erty question is present, 70 percent will be granted. Indeed,
starting with any one of the three values, more and more peti-
tions will be granted as other values are added. Thus it is ap-
parent that, for this time period, certain subjective value prefer-
ences consistently affected the Court's decision. If such con-
sistency is present in the current Court, in regard to the same
or different values, any change to a new decision making body
threatens the dominant value structure embodied by the Court
itself.
As for the major question, an answer may be derived from
the Burton record of certiorari votes in the 1947-1956 terms.
Here the analysis is limited to the four values suggested by the
earlier investigators, since the purpose of this Article is to make
a point rather than to delineate the full panoply of subjective
value preferences that might have characterized the Supreme
Court's work in this particular decade. The analysis should in-
dicate whether cases involving dissension in the lower courts,
civil liberties questions, economic questions or the federal gov-
ernment as a petitioning party are associated on other than a
chance basis with the decisions of individual justices to grant
56. Variance,-as used here, refers to the co-variation between var-
iables. The variance is measured by the square of the correlation co-
efficient and then multiplied by 100 to devise the percentages used.
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or deny certiorari, the direction of any associations that may
occur, the probability that any association is not a chance oc-
currence, the strength of any association identifed, and the dif-
ferences, if any, on each of four dimensions among the 15 justices
investigated.
To derive answers to these questions, the variable of grant
or denial of certiorari has first been paired with the presence or
absence of each value variable and then (a) a measure of associa-
tion including direction, (b) the probability that the association is
non-chance, and (c) the strength of the association has been com-
puted. The raw data for each four cell table with the cells des-
ignated in the traditional A, B, C, D manner are presented for
each justice in Table 1.5 7 This Table also provides the total num-
ber of cases for each justice, a number that varies primarily with
the number of years served by each justice during this particular
decade. The contingency coefficient "C" measures degree of as-
sociation and is presented in Column 4.58 If the direction of the
association is negative, a minus sign in parentheses has been
placed in the same column. The probability that any associa-
tion is a chance occurrence is provided in Column 5, while the
strength of any association is measured by lambda and depicted
in Column 6.59
Considering the four dimensions individually, a good deal
of inter-justice variation is seen. Analysis shows a significant 0
and non-chance association between the value "dissension" and
decision on certiorari applications for 11 justices but no sig-
nificant association for four. The probability of these associa-
tions being due to chance factors varies from less than five in 100
in two cases to less than one in 1,000 for eight justices. In some
cases the probabilities have been even smaller, but the tables used
here were not calculated beyond the .001 level. The direction of
the associations in all 11 cases is positive.
57. The cell entries are portrayed horizontally to save space, but
the more familiar format for any four cell table can be constructed in
the mind's eye or otherwise by placing cells A and B atop cells C and D.
58. For a good discussion of contingency coefficients, see SIDNEY
SIEGEL, NONPARAMaRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 196-202
(1956).
59. For a discussion of lambda, see L.C. FREEMAN, ELEMENTARY
APPLIED STATISTICS 71-78 (1965).
60. Statistical significance, as used here, refers to the probability
that the characteristics of a sample are representative of the population
from which the sample was drawn.
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TABLE I
Cross Tabulation of the Votes of 15 Supreme Court Justices to Grant or
Deny Certiorari With the Presence or Absence of Four Values: Dissen-
sion, Civil Liberty Question, Economic Enterprise Question, and Federal
Government as Petitioning Party: 1947-1956 Terms
Cont. Seq.
Cells Coeft of
A B C D N "C" C Lambda
B
U Diss. 273 570 208 751 1802 .119 .001
R CL. 145 413 336 898 1792 (-).013 -
T Econ. 250 685 232 630 1797 (-).002 -O Gov. 133 89 368 1346 1936 .269 .001 .078
N
R
U
T Diss. 52 49 56 62 219 .040 - .028
L CL. 47 34 61 77 219 .132 .05 .120
E Econ. 55 66 54 45 220 (-).090 - .083
D Gov. 15 9 100 115 239 .096 - .052
G
E
J
A Diss. 155 338 125 438 1056 .104 .001
C CL. 93 223 190 545 1051 .037
K Econ. 155 427 127 347 1056 (-).002
S Gov. 47 89 241 755 1132 .077 .01O
N
M
U Diss. 57 48 51 68 224 .113 - .083
R CL. 54 29 55 86 224 .244 .001 .229
P Econ. 51 73 58 43 225 (-).160 .05 .137
H Gov. 19 6 98 120 243 .185 .01 .111
y
D
0 Diss. 375 431 378 538 1722 .053 .05
U CL. 295 240 458 721 1714 .150 .001 .073
G Econ. 349 541 406 424 1720 (-).097 .001 -
L Gov. 103 111 698 938 1850 .035
A
S
F
R
A
N Diss. 247 582 216 740 1785 .082 .001
K CL. 183 371 284 937 1775 .102 .001 -
F Econ. 202 721 266 591 1780 (-).103 .001
U Gov. 91 131 396 1302 1920 .129 .001
R
T
E
R
R Diss. 293 519 237 684 1733 .111 .001
E CL. 135 396 394 798 1723 (-).076 .01
E Econ. 301 602 229 597 1729 .061 .05
D Gov. 149 65 398 1250 1862 .303 .001 .154
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Cont. Seq.
Cells Coeff. of
A B C D N "C" C Lambda
B Diss. 357 471 354 599 1781 .061 .05 .......
L CL. 265 291 445 770 1771 .104 .001 -----
A Econ. 337 587 374 478 1776 (-).076 .001 .......
C Gov. 104 117 660 1035 1916 .053 .05
V
I Diss. 143 283 89 401 916 .174 .001 ......
N CL. 74 212 161 464 911 .001 .
S Econ. 130 359 104 323 916 .026 ..............
o Gov. 63 57 178 693 991 .237 .001 .025
N
M
I Diss. 152 517 119 628 1416 .086 .01
N CL. 85 328 185 809 1407 .023 ...... .......
T Econ. 133 606 137 536 1412 (-).030 .........O Gov. 79 104 200 1137 1520 .231 .001 .
N
C Diss. 238 476 159 659 1532 .156 .001 .......
L CL. 113 335 287 787 1522 (-).016 ...........
A Econ. 212 581 187 546 1526 .014 -...
R Gov. 109 78 303 1154 1644 .265 .001 .075
K
w
A Diss. 161 247 129 326 863 .117 .001
R CL. 87 179 203 388 857 (-).016 .............
R Econ. 148 284 141 284 857 .012 ....... ......
E Gov. 66 34 239 583 922 .237 .001 .105
N
H
A Diss. 98 201 83 240 622 .078 ..............
R CL. 59 141 122 295 617 .003 ..............
L Econ. 83 203 97 234 617 (-).003 -........
A Gov. 37 27 150 452 666 .211 .001 .054
N
B
R Diss. 23 21 14 54 112 .313 .001 .054E
N CL. 17 31 20 43 111 .039 ....... ......
N Econ. 14 26 23 47 110 .022 -A Gov. 6 3 33 77 119 .202 .05 .077
N
w
H
I Diss. 10 8 8 18 44 .241 .111
T CL. 8 14 10 12 44 (-).092--------
A Econ. 4 9 13 17 43 (-).117 ....... ....
K Gov. 3 0 15 28 46 .313 .05 .167
ER
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Notes: Cells are defined as follows: A = cases in which certiorari is
granted and value present; B = cases in which certiorari is de-
nied and value present; C = cases in which certiorari is
granted and value absent; D = cases in which certiorari is denied
and value absent. Negative associations, i.e., prodominance of
cases in which presence of value is associated with denial and
vice versa, are indicated by the minus sign in parentheses C-)
in column three.
That is, for these 11 justices, the presence of dissension in
the lower courts is associated with a decision to grant certiorari
while its absence is related to a decision to deny review. It is
the combination of these two situations that determines the level
of the contingency measure.
Since the determination that an association exists says noth-
ing about the strength of the association, an additional measure
is needed. The strength of an association can be measured by
the ability to predict one variable from knowledge of a second.
The lambda coefficient provides the percentage increase in pre-
dictive ability, given information on the second variable, over
predictive accuracy when utilizing the mode of the first variable
only. It may be used to measure the strength of the associations
found for each of the 11 justices. How much increase in pre-
dictive ability is to be considered significant is not a matter of
objective evaluation since a small percentage increase given a
large "n?" may, for certain purposes, be considered more impor-
tant than a large percentage increase for a small "n" as a conse-
quence of the mere difference in number of cases. However, if
five percent is arbitrarily characterized as significant improve-
ment, strong relationships are found in only two of the 11
cases. Knowing whether "dissension" is present or absent en-
ables a prediction of Justice Murphy's response at a level of ac-
curacy 8.3 percent higher than if such information were lacking.
The comparable figure for Justice Brennan is 5.4 percent. Thus,
while "dissension" appears to influence the decisions of 11 jus-
tices, the impact of "dissension" seems weak in nine instances.
For the civil liberty value, significant associations are found
for only six of the Justices-Rutledge, Murphy, Douglas, Frank-
furter, Reed and Black. The probability that the associations
are chance occurrences varies from one in 1,000 for Justices Mur-
phy, Douglas, Frankfurter and Black, to five in 100 for Justices
Rutledge and Reed. The direction of the association is positive
in five of the six cases but negative for Justice Reed. Thus, for
five of the justices the presence of the civil liberty value favors
the granting of certiorari and its absence has the opposite effect,
while for Justice Reed the reverse is true.
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It is notable here that four of the Court's "libertarians" 6t
during the decade under study appear positively inclined to re-
view civil liberty cases while Justice Reed, a "non-libertarian"
seems disinclined to do so. Justice Frankfurter's measure of
association is probably due more to his proclivity for voting to
deny applications for certiorari than to a pro-civil liberty orien-
tatiom This distinction is seen clearly when the entry in cell A
is taken as a percentage of the entry in cell D. For Justices
Rutledge, Murphy, Douglas and Black, the percentage varies
from 34 to 63 percent. For Justice Frankfurter, it is only 20 per-
cent. On the other side, two so-called "libertarians," Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Justice Brennan, show no significant association
between the presence of a civil liberty question and inclination
to review.62
The separation of "libertarians" and "non-libertarians,"
though not perfect, is also seen in the comparative strengths of
the associations discovered. Although the association for Jus-
tice Black is weak, those for Justices Rutledge, Murphy and Doug-
las are measured at levels of 12, 22.9 and 7.3 percent respectively.
On the other hand, in the cases of Justices Frankfurter and Reed,
the associations are quite weak.
Economic enterprise questions do not appear to have moti-
vated any justice appreciably. It is true that significant associ-
ations are revealed for five of the 15 justices, but of the five only
Justice Murphy at 11.15 shows any strength in the relationship.
While Justice Murphy is an exception in that regard, he is one
of 10 justices who show a negative association between the deci-
sion to grant certiorari and the presence or absence of an eco-
nomic question. In general, these data indicate that the pres-
ence or absence of an economic enterprise question is of no great
importance except for Justice Murphy who denies a majority
of the cases in which the value is present and grants a majority
of those in which it is absent. With the exception of Justice
Murphy, the finding here is entirely consistent with the finding
of Tanenhaus that the economic enterprise value is of no conse-
quence in determining the grant or denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court.
61. "Libertarian" as used here refers to those justices reputed to be
unusually sympathetic to those claiming a violation of their civil liber-
ties or rights. "Non-libertarians" do not evince such unusual sympathy.
For precise differentiations of the justices in this dimension, see G.
SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND (1965).
62. It is interesting to note that the "libertarians" appointed by
the Democratic president, Franklin Roosevelt, are set off from the liber-
tarians appointed by the Republican president, Dwight Eisenhower.
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These findings open up the possibility that, to those for
whom the review of economic questions is important, the trans-
fer of most of the cases now entering the Supreme Court under
its discretionary power to a new screening court may allow more
time for the proper treatment and review of economic issues.
Clearly, since up to one half of the cases reviewed in any given
term are civil liberties cases and since these cases enter under
the Supreme Court's discretionary authority, a shift of the
screening process to a different set of judges, who are perhaps
both less subject .to influence by minorities and disadvantaged
individuals and more conservative in outlook generally, would
not only reduce the high Court's workload but also reduce the
proportion of civil liberties-civil rights cases heard each term.
The final value is the presence of the federal government as
a petitioning party. Here the data reveal the least amount of
variation among the 15 justices in the sense that significant as-
sociations are found for 13. Eight of these are significant at the
.001 level, two at .01 and three at .05. Thus, the contingency
coefficient "C" is considerably higher in these cases than for
other values. In other words, there is less doubt that the rela-
tionship is non-chance for this value than for the other three
factors. Remarkably, the direction of the association for all 15
justices is positive. Thus, the presence of the federal govern-
ment as petitioner appears to favor the granting of review while
its absence seems to favor denial. The relationship for the 13
justices with significant associations is strong for eight of the jus-
tices and weak for the remaining five. The eight include such
"conservatives"63 as Justice Burton (7.8%), Reed (15.4%), Clark
(7.5%), Harlan (5.4%), and Whittaker (16.7%), but also include
Justices.Murphy (11.7%), Warren (10.5%) and Brennan (7.7%o).
This is initial evidence for the conclusion that the justices differ
in the extent to which they are influenced by the presence of
the federal government in their decision to grant or deny cer-
tiorari. Beyond that, the fact that the presence or absence of
the federal government as a petitioning party influences 13 of 15
justices enables that value to be described as, perhaps, a dom-
inant one for the Court. It cannot be known, however, whether
a shift of the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction to a
National Court of Appeals would maintain the dominance of this
value or alter its status in some manner.
So far, the results have been sufficiently suggestive to war-
rant a closer analysis of the question whether Supreme Court
63. Or "non-libertarians." See note 61 supra.
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justices differ at the individual level as to the role played by
the four selected values in deciding whether to grant or deny
certiorari. By taking the four values individually, the possi-
bility of intercorrelations among them has not been considered.
If, for example, two values are perfectly correlated, it may be
erroneous to attribute any effect at all to one of them since the
total effect could be attributed to one of the two. More gener-
ally, it is necessary to know both the explanatory power of all
four values taken collectively and the contribution of each
value to the collective explanation when the effect of the other
three is ruled out. These matters may be explored through mul-
tiple regression and partial correlation techniques.0 4
In Table II, the results of regressing four values on the
votes of each justice to grant or deny certiorari are presented.
The Table shows that in "discussed cases" in the 1947-1956 terms,
four selected values "explained" from 1.8 percent of the variance
for Justice Black to 26.8 percent for Justice Whittaker. The ex-
plained variance reached a statistically significant level for all the
justices with the exception of Justice Rutledge. These figures
may be compared to those derived by Tanenhaus for the Court as
a whole. Tanenhaus reports a total explained variance of 13.7
percent using three values. In this analysis of the four values,
the data indicate that, for discussed cases only, two justices ex-
ceed that figure and several others approximate it. On the other
hand, a large number do not come close to that level.
On its face, the evidence from Table II suggests a consid-
erable variation in the impact of four values across these 15
justices. If significance tests for the differences among the vari-
ances are run, some of the differences (for example, that be-
tween Justice Douglas and Frankfurter) are not significant.
Others (such as those between Justices Murphy and Douglas or
Justices Reed and Black) are quite significant. Clearly, then,
there exists firm evidence that these 15 justices differed mean-
ingfully in the effect of four selected values (taken collectively)
on their voting patterns on certiorari applications. If this find-
ing is generalizable, variation in the voting patterns of any set
64. Good discussions of these methods may be found in H. BLA-
LOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS (1960). Purists may note that all the assump-
tions which underlie these methods, such as the tests of statistical sig-
nificance used, are not met by our dichotomized data. We concede the
point but follow Tanenhaus here. (See note 55 supra). Significance
levels reported are those that would be obtained if the necessary as-
sumptions were met and are reported for those who might be interested
in such a question.
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of judges on the same or similar questions would be expected
within the group and when compared with the patterns of any
other set of judges such as those on the Supreme Court.
TABLE II
Percentage of Variance in Decisions of
Individual Justices to Grant or Deny Certiorari
Accounted For by Four Values, 1947-1956 Terms
Justice % Variance Explained F Level Sig. of F
Burton 8.6 45.47 .001
Rutledge 3.7 2.44
Jackson 2.5 7.20 .001
Murphy 12.2 8.27 .001
Douglas 3.0 14.23 .001
Frankfurter 3.9 19.58 .001
Reed 11.0 57.08 .001
Black 1.8 8.75 .001
Vinson 8.33 22.39 .001
Minton 6.24 25.22 .001
Clark 9.12 41.13 .001
Warren 6.75 16.6 .001
Harlan 5.38 9.4 .001
Brennan 14.1 4.69 .001
Whittaker 26.8 3.76 .01
A final analysis will indicate the extent to which the 15 jus-
tices differed in the contribution to explanation made by each
value in the equation. In the earlier analysis using four cell
tables, the association of each value with decision was measured,
ignoring the effect that the other three variables might have had
on the measure. A similar analysis is now run in which the effect
of three values is controlled while the association for each value
is remeasured. That is, the partial correlation coefficient for
each value and decision is extracted while controlling in turn for
the remaining variables. Table EI indicates the results.
TABLE III
Partial Correlations Between Each of Four Values ((1) Dissension, (2)
Civil Liberty Question, (3) Economic Enterprise Question, and (4) Fed-
eral Government as Petitioning Party) and Decision on Certiorari Appli-
cations, by Individual Justice, 1947-1956 Terms, U.S. Supreme Court
Variables % Variance Sig. of
Justice Partial Controlled "Explained"
Burton .089 4, 3, 2 .79
.022 4, 3, 1
-.006 4, 2, 1
.265 3, 2, 1 7.02 .001
Rutledge .046 4, 3, 2 .21 _
.148 4, 3, 1 2.19 .-
.036 2, 1 .12 -
.110 3, 2, 1 1.21
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TABLE III (Continued)
Variables % Variance Sig. of
Justice Partial Controlled "Explained"
Jackson .101 4, 3, 2 1.02
.086 4, 3, 1 .73
.054 4, 2, 1 .29 ........
.057 3, 2, 1 .32
Murphy .103 4, 3, 2 1.06
.218 4, 3, 1 4.75 .02
-. 007 4, 2, 1
.221 3, 2, 1 4.88 .02
Douglas .067 4, 3, 2 .44 --------
.131 4, 3, 1 1.71
-.007 4, 2, 1 ------
.036 3, 2, 1 .12 ......
Frankfurter .084 4, 3, 2 .70 ........
.087 4, 3, 1 .75
-.038 4, 2, 1 .......
.126 3, 2, 1 1.58 .
Reed .070 4, 3, 2 .49 .......
-.001 4, 3, 1
.040 4, 2, 1 .16
.302 3, 2, 1 9.12 .001
Black .062 4, 3, 2 .38 ------
.078 4, 3, 1 .60
-. 025 4, 2, 1 --------
.050 3, 2, 1 .25
Vinson .137 4, 3, 2 1.87
.066 4, 3, 1 .43
.045 4, 2, 1 .20
.216 3, 2, 1 4.66 .001
Minton .066 4, 3, 2 .43
.039 4, 3, 1 .15
-.008 4, 2, 1
.226 3, 2, 1 5.10 .001
Clark .124 4, 3, 2 1.53
.036 4, 3, 1 .12
.012 4, 3, 1
.273 3, 2, 1 7.45 .001
Warren .090 4, 3, 2 .81
.022 4, 3, 1
.002 4, 2, 1
.232 3, 2, 1 5.38 .001
Harlan .068 4, 3, 2 .46 .......
.057 4, 3, 1 .32 .......
.012 4, 2, 1
.209 3, 2, 1 4.36 .01
Brennan .310 4, 3, 2 9.61 .001
.100 4, 3, 1 1.00 --------
-.038 4, 2, 1 .14 ......
.184 3, 2, 1 3.38
Whittaker .377 4, 3, 2 14.21 .001
.020 4, 3, 1
-.283 4, 2, 1 8.00 .001
.418 3, 2, 1 17.47 .001
The partial correlation
impact of the four values
analysis reveals that the differential
is of somewhat greater magnitude
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than suggested by the earlier analysis. When federal govern-
ment as petitioning party, economic question, and civil liberty
question are controlled, it is found that dissension has appre-
ciable impact on certiorari decisions only for Justice Brennan.
That value alone accounts for 9.61 percent of the variance in his
votes when the effects of the other three values are neutralized.
Applying the same routine to each value and each justice in turn
shows that the civil liberty value contributes significantly to
explain variance only for Justice Murphy. The presence or
absence of an economic question helps explain only the votes of
Justice Whittaker.
In the case of the fourth value-federal government as a
petitioning party-a somewhat different picture is portrayed.
This value makes a significant contribution to explanation for
nine of the 15 justices, namely Justices Burton, Murphy, Reed,
Vinson, Minton, Clark, Warren, Harlan and Whittaker. In all
nine cases, the presence of the value increases the chance that
the justice will vote to grant certiorari. It may be noted that of
these nine justices, seven are usually considered conservative
on the rights of the individual against government (Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Justice Murphy being the exceptions). The re-
maming six are Justices Jackson, Douglas, Frankfurter, Black,
Rutledge and Brennan. Of these, Justices Jackson and Frank-
furter are generally viewed as conservative or moderate while
Justices Black, Douglas, Rutledge and Brennan are generally
considered libertarians. Thus, the breakdown here between
those who let the presence or absence of the federal government
as petitioner affect their decision on petitions for certiorari and
those who do not is roughly, though not perfectly, correlated
with what would be expected if decision behavior on certiorari
applications were simply another dimension of the attitudes
which account for the behavior of the justices when deciding
cases "on the merits."
In his earlier investigation, Tanenhaus found that three val-
ues-dissension, civil liberty question and federal government as
petitioning party-explained significant proportions of the vari-
ance in Supreme Court certiorari decisions. In a later study
restricted to discussed cases in the 1955 term, it was found that
of the three values, only the presence of the federal government
as petitioning party had any impact.0 5 The findings here are
65. Ulmer, Hintze & Kirldosky, The Decision to Grant or Deny
Certiorari: Further Consideration of Cue Theory, 6 LAw AwD Socirny
REvIEW 637 (1972).
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consistent with this latter result since only that value had any
impact on individual justices in discussed cases in the 10 year
period studied and then only for nine of 15 justices. While
this observation is reported for its intrinsic interest, the main
concern is focused on the differences among justices in the
amount of the variance explained by federal government as pe-
titioning party. Here the data not only show the difference be-
tween the groups of nine and six, but within the nine justices,
the explained variance runs from 4.36 to 17.47 percent. These
figures may be compared to that of 7.4 percent for the Court
which Tanenhaus reported and to that of 9.3 percent found in the
second study mentioned above. Clearly, this constitutes sub-
stantial evidence for the proposition that Supreme Court justices
vary idiosyncratically in their responses to certiorari applica-
tions. This can only add to the uncertainties about the subjective
value preferences that will be reflected in discretionary jurisdic-
tional decisions made by any other group of judges, whether they
be new members of the Supreme Court or a new set of judges
who sit on a National Court of Appeals.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, the number of cases coming to the Su-
preme Court for review has reached a point that has concerned
most of the members of the Court. In order to handle the vast
number of requests for review under its discretionary jurisdic-
tion, the Court has been forced to utilize time that might have
been spent on cases given full review. The Study Group on
the Case Load of the Supreme Court has recommended what
appears to be a simple solution to the problem by the establish-
ment of a new National Court of Appeals to screen all applica-
tions for review in the Supreme Court, thereby decreasing the
number of cases that actually reach the Court.
Modification of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is nothing
new. It has occurred periodically throughout the Court's his-
tory. In each instance, the changes gave the Court greater dis-
cretion in choosing the cases it would hear. Since the "Judges
Bill" of 1925, the Court's broadened discretionary jurisdiction
has enabled it to exercise almost complete control over its docket.
In contrast to earlier legislation enlarging the Court's discre-
tionary jurisdiction, the proposal of the Study Group would, by
and large, eliminate it. This is said to be necessary since the
exercise of discretion itself has now become a time consuming
administrative burden.
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On each occasion in the past in which cases have been
shifted from the Court's obligatory to its discretionary jurisdic-
tion, the ostensible reason has been to correlate workload with
adequate administrative procedure. Always in these instances,
a backlog of cases on the docket could and has been used to
buttress the argument for change. The Study Group and those
who support its proposal have availed themselves of the same
justification for a Court that is current in its docket Conse-
quently, one may wonder if other factors are at work in the
present situation. One might speculate, for example, that the
suggested reform, which cannot reduce a non-existent backlog
of cases, could (a) improve the quality of decisions and opin-
ions delivered in cases reviewed, (b) change the subject matter
mix of the cases chosen for review, or (c) restructure group or
interest relationships to the extent that such relationships de-
pend on court-made policies. The Study Group has suggested
the first possibility but not the second or third. Indeed, some
members of the Study Group have affirmatively denied a mo-
tivation to accomplish the latter two possibilities.
Since administrative reform always involves a policy dimen-
sion irrespective of the motivations of the reformers, it is not
necessary to determine the complete scope of the ends sought by
the Study Group. The initial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
as set by the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789, incorpo-
rated certain policy preferences held by their framers. Subse-
quent changes have maintained or added to the Court's adminis-
trative structure certain policy biases, the most obvious of which
has been the establishment of a federal court system and appel-
late procedures which tend to preserve the Constitution, federal
statutes and treaties. A second example inheres in repeated
choices over time to diminish the rights of individuals to have
their cases reviewed in the Supreme Court because of the need
for greater efficiency.
Policy considerations are also central in any shift of discre-
tionary jurisdiction from one court to another. By definition,
discretionary jurisdiction is not exercised by any hard, fast and
binding rules specified in advance and not subject to individual
interpretation. On the contrary, one might expect that the use
of such discretion would vary among both courts and individuals.
Variation in the subjective value preferences of individual Su-
preme Court justices in voting on certiorari applications has
been shown for the Court's 1947-1956 terms. This finding sug-
gests that such variation will occur in any collegial court exercis-
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ing discretionary jurisdiction and among any set of judges. The
uncertainty as to whether the judges in the National Court of Ap-
peals will exercise their discretion in terms of the subjective
preferences of the Supreme Court suggests the need for greater
exploration of these possibilities as well as the need for more
attention to alternative arrangements.
Moving from the level of the individual judge to that of
courts qua courts, it has been shown that a single value-supe-
riority of a federal government request for review-was re-
flected in the voting patterns of nine of 15 justices in the
1947-1956 terms of the Court. Since it takes only four of nine
votes to grant certiorari, the federal government fared quite
well in this decade when it was the petitioning party. 0 Since
in most such cases the non-petitioning party is one who has
claimed the violation of a civil liberty or civil right and has been
upheld below, review itself has often worked to diminish the
right of the individual against the power of the state. The prob-
lem is enhanced if, as many commentators believe, the present
Supreme Court is more sympathetic to the claims of government
than the Court that sat in the 1947-1956 terms. It is not at all
certain, however, that a new National Court of Appeals would
give the federal government's requests for review greater or
lesser shift than the 1947-1956 Court. At the same time, the rule
of four has operated in such a way that one half or more of
the cases reviewed each term are civil liberty cases. A shift of
discretionary jurisdiction to a new Court could alter this propor-
tion of cases, leading to a situation where the lawmaking in this
area is left to state and lower federal courts. While it may be
argued that this reasoning merely conjures up a hobgoblin and
that nothing of the sort will in fact occur, the uncertainties are
sufficient to lead astute observers such as former Justice Arthur
Goldberg and others to prefer reforms with less threatening pos-
sibilities.
On balance, there is little question that the Study Group
proposal would contribute to "administrative efficiency." Re-
lieved of its duty to review application for certiorari, the Su-
preme Court could give greater attention to those it does re-
view. The proposal has been made by sophisticated members of
66. In the period 1947-1956, the federal government won 54% of its
criminal cases in the Supreme Court. In the same time span, however,
the Court denied review to 69% of those who sought to have government
victories below overturned. See Supreme Court Justices as Strict and
Not-so-Strict Constructionists: Some Implications, LAW & SOcIE.TY RE-
vnw (forthcoming).
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the bar and sophisticated students of judicial processes who un-
derstand, theoretically, the possible ramifications of their pro-
posals in non-administrative areas. However, their tendency to
assign low probabilities to some of the theoretical possibilities
discussed in this paper is disappointing. Given the extent to
which administrative reform has effected substantive policy
change in the past, the Study Group has not been sufficiently
sensitive to the policy consequences of its proposal.
Finally, it is not asserted that an interest group revolution,
in terms of shifting the values to be served by judicial struc-
tures, has been carefully planned and will be implemented by
the adoption of the Study Group's recommendation. However,
whether planned or not, such a result may be endemic to the
proposed structural change. Consequently, for those who wish
to see the policies favored by the Supreme Court in recent years
maintained, some other method of reducing pressure on the time
and intellect of the Court might reasonably be preferred.

